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Abstract 
 
The health care industry seems prima facie obligated to respond to the demands and expectations 
of those multicultural communities that make up its stakeholder base. However, as prima facie, this 
obligation fails to justify “cultural competence” amongst health care professionals or the health 
care industry. Without some justification, one can only assume that cultural competence is a 
bilateral process requiring multicultural communities themselves to assume the responsibility for 
their own care. Relying on a Rawlsian conception of justice, I argue against the view that cultural 
competence is a bilateral process in this case, and that health care professionals in particular and 
the health care industry in general have an obligation to attain to cultural competence in order to 
satisfy a fundamental principle of justice, what Rawls calls the “difference principle.” 
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“Cultural (In) Competence, Justice, and Expectations of Care:   An Illustration” 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
We can agree on two critical, and interrelated, propositions right off the bat: the first is that 
multiculturalism in the United States has created a unique set of challenges to the health care 
industry that it must address (either for economic or for professional reasons); the second, 
necessitated by the first, is that some minimal degree of competence is required in order to 
properly recognize and address those challenges as they arise in the patient-physician 
relationship.  The question is: where, or on whom, does the burden of competence lie?  Prima 
facie, again either for economic reasons or professional ones, namely, those required by the 
Hippocratic Oath, it seems that the burden of competence falls squarely on the shoulders of 
health care professionals as a matter of duty.  But is this prima facie duty assumed by health care 
professionals?  It might be that health care professionals internalize the duty to be as competent 
as possible when dealing with their client base; but this might be a case of simply knowing that 
something is right but not believing in it enough to do anything about it.
1
  In any event, it does 
not seem that this prima facie duty or obligation, the duty or obligation to cultural competence in 
this multicultural world, is convincing enough to justify the cultural understanding required to 
deal with those unique set of issues that multiculturalism gives rise to.   
 
My aim in this paper is to speculate about health care access and issues of justice that might arise 
as a result of the emergence of multiculturalism in our society.  Thus, mine is merely a 
speculative exercise—but I’ll give one concrete example so as to illustrate my point throughout.  
My parents are originally from Mexico…Southern Mexico to be precise.  Neither of them speaks 
                                                 
1
 An example of this might be believing that everyone, regardless of race or class, is entitled to health care but not 
believing in this enough to be willing to pay higher taxes or support health care reform.   
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English, although they have tried desperately to learn it over the last thirty-two years.  They 
understand it well enough to survive and prosper—relatively speaking.  They understand North 
American culture.  They are well aware, perhaps instinctively by now, of the nature of North 
American capitalism, its Protestant Ethic, its social hierarchies, the vital importance it places on 
certain professions, such as police officers, doctors, and lawyers (although judging from 
representation in the Media this is not self-evident); they understand, finally, their place in the 
culture and the limits it places on their own (social and cultural) mobility.  
 
A family of eight, they’ve managed to stay out of the way, mostly: thus avoiding the negative 
aspects of social hierarchies, paying their taxes and keeping up with the demands of capitalism, 
and, most importantly, they have managed to avoid burdening the “sacred” professions, which 
means staying out of the court system, jail, and hospitals.  With one exception: one of my 
younger sisters suffers from a severe mental disorder.  Over the last 17 years she has been 
misdiagnosed, over-medicated, and under-treated: we still don’t know what her mental disorder 
is!  Every time I ask my mother about it she says: well, the doctor said she’s sick…but I didn’t 
understand him.  So she buys the pills and hopes for the best.  Whenever I request to speak to the 
doctor, nurses remind me that only my mother can speak for or on behalf of my sister.    
 
Without getting too involved in this case, the purely speculative (epistemological) question is: 
why does my mother not know what is wrong with my sister?  My answer is this: there is a 
breakdown in communication between my mother and the physicians where (a) my mother fails 
to clearly communicate what she expects from the physician, (b) the physician fails to 
understand both what my mother says and what she does not say, and (c) the physician stops 
short of asking the relevant questions in a way that is both clear and culturally sensitive.  We can 
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surely blame (a) for this breakdown in communication—my mother fails to clearly communicate 
what she expects.  However, due to cultural factors pertaining to the “sacred” role of the 
physician,
2
 my mother believes, and justifiably so, that her expectations, whether communicated 
or not, are being understood.  She understands, a priori, that her ignorance is no match for the 
physician’s superior intellect and advanced training.  Again, this is a cultural factor.  My claim is 
that we cannot hold her morally responsible in this case.  On the other hand, both (b) and (c)—
namely, that the physician fails to understand what my mother does not say and that he or she 
stops short of asking the relevant questions, require that we hold the physician morally 
blameworthy, since we can attribute both (b) and (c) to a certain degree of cultural 
incompetence.  Again, as I said at the beginning, it seems, prima facie, that cultural competence 
is a physician’s moral obligation.     
 
WHAT IS CULTURAL COMPETENCE?  
In a recent study published in the Journal of General Internal Medicine, researchers found that 
“Racial and ethnic minorities are more likely to perceive bias and lack of cultural competence in 
the health system” (Johnson, R., et. al., 2004, p. 106).  In fact, minorities were 15 times more 
likely to hold this opinion than whites (p. 107).  This lack of cultural competence, the researchers 
concluded, is in fact “a structural and clinical barrier to care” (p. 102).  Indeed, since feeling 
misunderstood and being misunderstood coincide in this case—my sister’s case—cultural 
incompetence is a barrier to care.   
                                                 
2
 By and large, Latin Americans greatly admire and respect the opinion of the medical community. Philosophically, 
we can speculate as to the primary reason for this: an intimate, in fact, religious relationship with death and 
mortality.  Doctors are not preventing the inevitable—as we are apt to think from our Western perspective; rather, 
doctors make the transition into death more tolerable, more welcoming, we can even say, easier.  Doctors know 
death.  This knowledge makes them unique amongst the living.  As such, they deserve the respect and reverence 
which they get.   
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Broadly defined, cultural competence can be understood as “a set of congruent behaviors, 
attitudes, and policies that come together in a system, agency, or among professionals and 
enables that system, agency, or those professionals to work effectively in cross–cultural 
situations” (Cross et al., 1989).  Moreover, without cultural competence, “the ability of health 
care providers and health care organizations to understand and respond effectively to the cultural 
and linguistic needs brought by patients to the health care encounter” is lacking (Johnson, R., et 
al., 2004, p. 102).  And here we hit upon that aspect of cultural competence that lends it moral 
weight: it is an “ability” required by “health care professionals” to do their job!  
 
In the example cited above, my claim is that cultural competence is completely lacking.  It may 
be argued, however, that the multicultural landscape in which we live is so varied as to prevent 
something like a multi-cultural competence, that if cultural understanding is possible—through 
education or exposure, for instance—it will make one competent in one or two cultures, at most, 
but not all—it will not be multicultural competence.  While this is a fair objection, the point with 
cultural competence is that one is able to be open to the other’s difference and to be aggressive in 
the pursuit of that information required to make rational, informed, and professional decisions 
regarding a patient with a completely different set of expectations regarding his, hers or 
another’s care.    
 
PRIMA FACIE DUTIES: WHAT ARE THEY?  
At the start, I said that cultural competence was a prima facie duty which health care 
professionals must assume.  What I didn’t explain was the nature prima facie duties and the 
reason why they might be difficult to assume.   
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In The Right and the Good (1952), his landmark ethical treatise, the English philosopher W.D. 
Ross argues in favor of a deontological moral theory grounded on what he calls “prima facie 
duties.” Prima facie duties are duties that morally bind one to perform certain (morally 
significant) acts in certain (morally demanding) situations.  Thus one has a prima facie duty to 
keep one’s promises, to be grateful, to be just, to be benevolent, to self improve, and to refrain 
from causing harm to others.
3
  The question arises: What if one recognizes multiple prima facie 
duties at the same time, for instance, one’s duty to benevolence and one’s duty to not cause 
harm? Ross suggests that here we see the virtue of this theory: namely, that some duties can and 
will often override other duties, depending, of course, on the circumstance, so that one’s duty not 
to cause harm is, Ross says (1952), “of a more stringent characteristic” than one’s duty to be 
good (p. 178).  But just because prima facie duties are binding in different ways depending on 
the situation, it does not mean that these duties are arbitrary.  In fact, Ross argues, “There’s 
nothing arbitrary about these prima facie duties.  Each rests on a definite circumstance which 
cannot seriously be held to be without moral significance” (p. 177).   
 
When it comes to access to care, two prima facie duties are immediately intuited: duties of 
benevolence and duties of justice.  Duties of benevolence, says Ross (1952), “rest on the mere 
fact that there are other beings in the world whose condition we can make better in respect of 
virtue, or of intelligence, or of pleasure,” while duties of justice “rest on the fact or possibility of 
a distribution of pleasure or happiness (or the means thereto) which is not in accordance with the 
merit of the persons concerned” (p. 178).  Thus, access to medical care is a duty that rests on the 
“mere fact” that a person’s physical or mental condition obviously needs improvement.  But it 
also rests on the recognition that people in general should have an opportunity to be happy or 
                                                 
3
 This is a quick summary of the tentative “list” Ross provides.  According to Ross, there may be other prima facie 
moral duties not included in the list.   
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free from pain.  Whichever one of these two duties one determines as taking priority in cases 
dealing with access to health care is not important.  On the one hand, the physician should act 
simply because of the “mere fact” that a patient’s physical or mental condition is in a state of 
need or, on the other hand, he or she should act from a general duty to alleviate pain in his or her 
fellows.   
 
But, as we know, contemporary health care is essentially bureaucratic.  There are forms to fill 
out, HMO’s to bill, superiors to answer to, etc. It is a business in a capitalist world. What this 
means is that as prima facie, as immediately recognized obligations, prima facie duties are not 
mediated through decision procedures that one can appeal to and thus use to justify one’s actions.  
Put another way, it would go against bureaucratic dogma to care for someone simply because 
that person is in pain—there have to be other reasons, for instance, that the person is a patient 
with insurance, that the person is recognized by the doctor as someone who she/he’s treated, that 
the person meets all the required qualifications for personhood (rational, not an animal), etc.  
Hence, while cultural competence is a prima facie duty related to both benevolence and justice, 
not many people would justify re-education in cultural understanding on the basis of the obvious, 
prima facie, necessity to do so.  A doctor, for instance, who thinks it more important to keep up 
on the latest medical techniques might dedicate his time and resources to this endeavor instead of 
attending a seminar in cultural competence although, simultaneously, he recognizes that he ought 
to attend such a seminar for the sake of his patient roster.  However, it would be easier to justify 
the first of these than the second. 
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RAWLS AND A DECISION PROCEDURE  
The weakness of prima facie duties is that their recognition is immediate, so acting on them 
would require only that recognition.  Most people, however, require more elaborate reasons to 
justify their actions.  The more advanced the particular practice, for instance medicine and the 
business of medicine, the more elaborate the justifications required.  Even though dealing with 
others is not such an advanced practice, the context is, namely, the health industry.  Practitioners 
here require elaborate reasons for doing things, either because of “rules or regulations” or 
because of professional arrogance.  In either case, reasons always satisfy some rule or other 
(either a professional or a persona rule); a decision procedure is, therefore, necessary.   
 
If the basic ethical problem deals with the inability to attain to cultural competence, then the 
basic ethical problem is one of treating or not treating everyone, every stakeholder, fairly.  
Moreover, if, as I’ve suggested, this ethical problem is exacerbated by an unwillingness to act on 
prima facie moral duties due to their immediacy and lack of rational support, then what is needed 
in order to deal with this ethical problem is a decision procedure that both justifies one’s actions 
and fulfills some external requirement.  
 
I want to suggest that the work of American philosopher John Rawls offers a decision procedure 
meant to be both justificatory and just.  In his A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that all social 
arrangements should be structured so as to benefit the least advantaged members of society.  This 
is known as the Difference Principle, and Rawls (1999) puts it in the following way: “Social and 
economic inequalities are…to be to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged 
members of society” (p. 53). As an integral element of any egalitarian decision procedure, the 
“difference principle” lays out a plan of action meant for us to ensure that everyone has equal 
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access to opportunities, whatever these may be.  However, because people will generally find 
themselves either advantaged or disadvantaged with respect to those opportunities as a result of 
economic, physical, mental, linguistic, or cultural barriers, to name a few, access to those 
opportunities made available to all must be biased so as to guarantee the greatest probability of 
access to those who are least likely, or least capable, of taking advantage of them.  In our case, 
when it comes to health care access, health care professionals are required to attain to cultural 
competence even at the expense of disadvantaging (we could even say, inconveniencing) 
bureaucratic economics and efficiency as well as certain sectors of their client base who would 
consider cultural education as a waste of valuable, and most times scarce, resources that could be 
best used for technological or scientific upgrades.  
 
LET ME CONCLUDE… 
Cultural expectations, which any member of an alien culture brings with him or her to the 
doctor-patient relationship, are barriers to proper medical care if and when these expectations are 
neither understood nor addressed.  Of these expectations, examples abound: these may be 
religious, as when a patient expects not to be undergo a particular procedure because of reasons 
pertaining to religious dogma; these may be social, as when a patient expects her doctor to know 
the source of aches and pains without communicating these aches and pains to the doctor; or 
these can be cultural-linguistic, as when the patient expects a minimal degree of understanding 
and acknowledgement from her doctor.  Ultimately, at the risk of inconveniencing a certain 
population, or of inconveniencing themselves, physicians must, as a matter of justice, attain to 
cultural competence.  It is a duty justified through reason, compassion, and a sense of justice.  As 
Rawls (1999) puts it: “Thus we are led to the difference principle if we wish to set up the social 
system so that no one gains or loses from his arbitrary place in the distribution of natural assets 
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or his initial position in society without giving or receiving compensating advantages in return” 
(p. 87).   Indeed, as a decision procedure the difference principle asks us to consider our actions, 
those who will be affected by those actions, and whether or not they will be advantaged by our 
actions.  If our action is to attain to cultural competence for the sake of individuals who by 
historical accident do not speak our language or have a different set of expectations when they 
deal with us, then these folks will be advantaged by our actions and our actions are—whether or 
not it contributes to the bottom line—just.  Again, mine is merely a speculative exercise 
motivated by a genuine wish to know the extent of my sister’s illness and a sincere belief that 
cultural incompetence is what is keeping many of us in the dark.   
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